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TAXATION - INCOME TAX - EXEMPTION OF PROCEEDS OF INSURANCE
Poucrns PAYABLE IN THE FORM OF AN ANNUITY - Plaintiff was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy payable in equal installments over a period of
twenty years. The deferred payments had been substituted for payment of the
face amount of the policy through an option in the policy exercised by the in-
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sured a short time before his death. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
included in gross income the amount by which each payment exceeded onetwentieth of the face amount of the policy on the theory that this excess was
interest and hence not within the statute exempting insurance from gross income.1 Plaintiff sued to recover the tax paid. Held, for the commissioner, on
the ground that Congress in enacting the statute in question intended to exempt
only the face amount of the policy. Kaufman v. United States, (D. C. Va.
1941) 40 F. Supp. 505.
There has been much controversy as to the Congressional intent in enacting
the income tax provisions exempting thJ proceeds of insurance from gross income.2 In Commissioner of Internal RC'llenue v. Winslow 3 it was decided that
the words exempting sums paid "by reason of the death of the insured, whether
in a single sum or otherwise," were framed by Congress with the intention of
including in the exemption the entire amount of any annuity payments made in
discharging the obligation of the insurance policy. This conclusion was based
largely on the history of the successive amendments to the statute and on the
reports of Congressional committees.4 When the total of deferred payments is
more than the face amount of the policy, each payment really amounts to a
payment of a portion of the face amount of the policy plus interest. Since interest
payments are normally taxable, 5 this decision encourages tax avoidance by inserting an option in a policy allowing discharge through deferred payments.
Thus the beneficiary can be assured a steady income over a period of years completely exempt from income taxes. Despite the Winslow case, the Treasury
1 The face amount of the policy (including minor dividend accumulations) was
$56,804.86. The annual annuity paid was $3,328.92, which exceeds one-twentieth of
the face amount of the policy by $788.67. This latter amount was considered as interest and included in gross income by the commissioner.
2
48 Stat. L. 687 (1934), 26 U. S. C. (1934), § 22(b): "Exclusions from gross
income.-The following items shall not be included in gross income and shall be
exempt from taxation under this title: ( l) Life insurance.-Amounts received under a
life insurance contract paid by reason of the death of the insured, whether in a single
sum or otherwise (but if such amounts are held by the insurer under an agreement to
pay interest thereon, the interest payments shall be included in gross income) ••••"
3
(C.,C. A. 1st, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 418; followed in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Bartlett, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 766, and Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Buck, (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 775.
4
"Congress has been consistent in all its Acts in exempting from taxation amounts
received in settlement of death claims. It draws no distinction whether such amounts
are paid in instalments or as annuities. Accepting the analysis of the Commissioner
that the policy in question is a life insurance policy for $53,000 principal value payable
as an annuity, rather than one for $100,000 payable in 50 instalments, it still falls
precisely within the language of Section 22(b) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1934 according to the legislative intention as set forth in the reports by the Congressional committees. Thus, each $2,000 instalment paid to the respondent, even though it be considered as part annuity, must be excluded from the gross income." Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Winslow, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 418 at 423.
11
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-1 (1940).
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Regulations persist in taxing the interest elements 6 of each deferred payment,
and commentators and some courts are .finding justification for this position. 7
The intention of Congress in enacting the successive amendments to the statute
has been reexamined, and the conclusions reached in the Winslow case have been
found incorrect or at least subject to question. 8 Aside from the problem of Congressional intent, there are two other principles of interpretation which strongly
support the Treasury Regulations. The first is the broad aim of co-ordinating
the provision with the whole body of federal tax law, and with other provisions
of the income tax laws. 0 Throughout the federal tax structure, Congress has
treated annuity payments as having a composite character, a portion being interest
and a portion principal. Thus in the gift tax law, which in theory taxes only
the principal of the gift, the tax is placed on the commuted or present value of
the annuity at the date of the gift, not on the total payments actually received
by the donee.10 In the estate tax the treatment is similar.11 A corollary to this
treatment is found in those provisions of the income tax law dealing with annuities paid not by reason of the death of .the insured, in which there is a careful
separation and taxation of interest elements.12 Secondly, there is room for a
6
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(b)(1)-1 (1940): "While it is immaterial whether
the proceeds of a life insurance policy payable upon the death of the insured are paid
to the beneficiary in a single sum or in installments, only the amount paid solely by
reason of the death of the insured is exempted. The amount exempted is the amount
payable had the insured or the beneficiary not elected to exercise an option to receive
the proceeds of the policy or any part thereof at a later date or dates. If the policy
provides no option for payment upon the death of the insured, or provides only for
payments in installments, there is exempted only the amount which the insurance company would have paid immediately after the death of the insured had the policy not
provided for payment at a later date or dates. Any increment thereto is taxable."
7
See 50 YALE L. J. 322 (1940); 39 M1cH. L. REv. 493 (1941); 54 HARV.
L. REv. 142 (1940); and Allis v. La Budde, (D. C. Wis. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 59 at
61, where the court said: "It is, of course, possible to broadly interpret the phrase
'amounts received under a life insurance contract,' as was done in those cases, so as to
extend tax exemption to the income increment as well as the capital in life insurance
optional payments. However, such interpretation is contrary to the general rule of
construction of exemption statutes. It is contrary to what I finnly believe was the intent
of Congress."
8
For an excellent analysis of Congressional intent as manifested in the history
of the amendments to this statute, see 50 YALE L. J. 322 (1940).
9
Cf. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U.S. 39 at 42,
60 S. Ct. 51 (1939), where the Court said: "In ascertaining the correct construction
of the statutes taxing gifts, it is necessary to read them in the light of the closely related
provisions of the revenue laws taxing transfers at death, as they have been interpreted
by our decisions."
10
Treas. Reg. 79, arts. 19 ( 7) and 19( 9) ( l 93 6). The tax is placed on the purchase price of such an annuity contract as set by insurance companies.
11
Treas. Reg. So, arts. 1o(i) and 28 ( 1937).
12
48 Stat. L. 687 (1934), 26 U. S. C. (1934), § 22(b) (2); Treas. Reg. 103,
§ 19.22(b)(2)-2 (1940). The tax each year is placed on 3%, of the aggregate
premiums paid. The remainder of the annual annuity is considered a return of principal and is not taxed. When by these calculations the entire premium payments have
been returned, all subsequent annuity payments are taxed in full as interest.
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more critical interpretation of the words "amounts received under an insurance
contract." The Winslow case and those following it tacitly assumed that the
whole of the annuity payments are within this language.111 However, it is
doubtful whether amounts in excess of the face value of the policy are received
under an insurance contract. It has been declared that the essence of an insurance contract is the existence of a risk assumed by the insurer,1¼ the risk in a
life insurance policy being the death of the insured. Therefore, only amounts
received because of this risk are received under an insurance contract. Amounts
in excess of the face value of the policy are paid not because of the risk involved,
but because the insurer is permitted to pay the face amount in installments rather
than in a lump sum. Discharge of the policy through deferred payments is in
effect an agreement to hold portions of the face amount of the policy as an investment and to pay interest thereon, 1:ven though this agreement is not expressly
stated in the policy.15 It would seem that taxpayers ought not to be permitted to
avoid taxation simply by calling their investment contracts "insurance" or
coupling them in the same contract with a legitimate insurance policy. If this
view be taken, that portion of the deferred payment representing the face amount
of the policy is received through an insurance risk and hence tax exempt, while
the interest portions of the payment are received through an investment contract
and are hence completely outside the scope of the exemption. The result in the
principal case is in accord with the progressive attitude toward tax legislation so
marked in recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court,1 6 and should
the question be reviewed by that Court, it is not unlikely that the commissioner
will be upheld.
W"lh
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111 "The language of this section-'amounts received under a life insurance contract paid by reason of the death of the insured, whether in a single sum or otherwise'
-is to be interpreted in its ordinary and natural meaning." Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Winslow, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 418 at 422.
14 Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, ,61 S. Ct. 646 (1941).
15 "The insurance risk, as defined by the Supreme Court, may well be said to have
ceased in the instant case at the time of the death of the insured. When the options
came into operation, the liability of the insurance companies had been fixed." Allis v.
La Budde, (D. C. Wis. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 59 at 61.
The following statement from the Winslow case itself supports this interpretation
(113 F. (2d) 418 at 422]: "Thus, it is apparent that this policy is not a policy for
$100,000 life insurance payable in 50 instalments but a policy for $53,000 life
insurance payable as a 50 year annuity in equal payments of $2,000. That it was
labelled a life insurance contract for $ I 00,000 is not controlling since in determining
tax liability, courts must look through form to fact and substance."
16 Cf. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144 (1940); Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940); McClain v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 311 U.S. 527, 61 S. Ct. 373 (1941). All are decisions giving broad scope
to the statutes, thus obviating any necessity for statutory amendments.

